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Crash Testing an Engineering Framework in 
Neuroscience: 
Does the Idea of Robustness Break Down?1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I discuss the concept of robustness in neuroscience. Various 
mechanisms for making systems robust have been discussed across biology 
and neuroscience (e.g. redundancy and fail-safes). Many of these notions 
originate from engineering. I argue that concepts borrowed from engineering 
aid neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness; (2) formulating 
hypotheses about mechanisms for robustness; and (3) quantifying robustness. 
Furthermore, I argue that the significant disanalogies between brains and 
engineered artefacts raise important questions about the applicability of the 
engineering framework. I argue that the use of such concepts should be 
understood as a kind of simplifying idealization.  
 
 
“The brain is a physical device that performs specific functions; therefore, its 
design must obey general principles of engineering.” 
Sterling and Laughlin (2015:xv) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I discuss a cluster of issues around the understanding of 
robustness in neuroscience. Systems biologist, Hiroaki Kitano defines 	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robustness as, “a property that allows a system to maintain its functions 
against internal and external perturbations” (Kitano 2004, p.826). According 
to this definition, in order to determine whether or not a system is robust, one 
must specify its function, and also specify the kinds of perturbation it faces. 
Empirically determinable questions then follow about how exactly the system 
achieves its robustness. Various means for making systems robust have been 
discussed across biology and neuroscience: copy redundancy, fail-safes, 
degeneracy, modularity, passive reserve, active compensation, plasticity, 
decoupling, and feedback (see Figure 1). It is obvious, but still worth 
emphasising, that most of these notions originate from engineering.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. The Engineering Framework for Robustness. A set of terms 
originating from engineering and control theory, which are applied to 
biological systems to explain how they achieve robust performance. 
 
In Section 2 of this paper I argue that the framework of concepts borrowed 
from engineering aids neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness by 
specifying functions of the system and determining possible sources of 
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perturbation; (2) formulating hypotheses about means for the system to 
achieve robustness; and (3) showing how robustness may be precisely 
quantified. This will be shown with examples of neuroscientific research 
which aims to measure robustness in a retinal circuit (Sterling and Freed 
2007), in the motor cortex (Svoboda 2015), and to develop models of 
homeostatic control (Davis 2006, O’Leary 2014).  
 
In Section 3 I argue that the use of the engineering framework in 
neuroscience gets stretched, perhaps to breaking point, when applied to 
systems where (1) there is no principled distinction between processes for 
robustness and processes which continually maintain the life of the cell; (2) 
where perturbations are a regular occurrence rather than anomalous events; 
and (3) where one should not conceive of the system as seeking to maintain a 
steady state. This point will be illustrated through examination of some 
recent work from Eve Marder’s laboratory, one of the key centres for research 
on robustness in neuroscience. 
 
I will argue that the limitations of the engineering notions are put into stark 
relief when one examines neural systems through the lens of the process 
approach to biology (Dupré 2012). The engineering perspective, to the extent 
that it treats biological systems as pre-specified objects with fixed functions, 
misses many of the features that make robust biological systems fascinating 
and which are highlighted by the process view. 
 
In Section 4 I will consider if it is necessary to re-engineer the concepts of 
robustness to be more in line with the dynamicism of biological systems; or 
alternatively, if we should accept the engineering perspective as it is, as one 
amongst many idealizing and simplifying heuristics for understanding 
complex systems like the brain. 
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2. PUTTING THE ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK TO USE 
 
The robustness of the brain is one of its many extraordinary attributes. By 
this I mean the fact that brains can undergo moderately severe external 
perturbations while still maintaining approximately normal function.  
Obviously, robustness has its limits and the brain’s characteristic patterns of 
resilience and fragility are an important target of research (Sporns 2010, 
chap. 10). In order to investigate robustness it is necessary first to specify 
what sorts of perturbations the system is robust to, and then to quantify how 
robust it actually is. Explanations of robustness can be developed by testing 
hypotheses concerning the exact mechanisms by which robust performance is 
achieved. The engineering framework can be put to effective use in each of 
these processes. 
 
For example, Sterling and Freed (2007) pose the question of how robust the 
retinal circuit is. They define robustness as the factor by which intrinsic 
capacity exceeds normal demand, which is the engineer’s notion of margin of 
safety (p.563). The idea can be illustrated through their comparison with 
bridge design. An engineer designing a road bridge will consider both the 
anticipated normal demand (e.g. commuter traffic) as well as the unusual 
demands that might occasionally be placed on the bridge (e.g. the passage of 
a 30 ton military vehicle). The unusual demand can be thought of as a 
“perturbation” in Kitano’s terms. A robust design will ensure that the system 
does not break when pushed beyond normal conditions. For a bridge this can 
be achieved with passive reserve (using thicker steel than is needed under 
normal conditions) and redundancy (including additional beams so that there 
are back-up structures if any parts are compromised). 
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Sterling and Freed take the bridge case to be analogous to the retinal circuit. 
Normal demand, for the retina, is the intensity of illumination that the eye 
will encounter under naturalistic stimulation conditions. The safety factor is 
calculated by experimental determination of the maximum illumination level 
under which neurons in the retina can maintain their ability to signal to 
downstream neurons. Sterling and Freed (2007, p.570) report that,  
“across successive stages in this neural circuit, safety factors are on the 
order of 2–10. Thus, they resemble those in other tissues and systems. 
Their similarity across stages also accords with the principle of 
symmorphosis—that efficient design matches capacities across stages that 
are functionally coupled….”  
 
Sterling and Freed’s explanation of robustness depends on the notion of 
passive reserve. For photoreceptor neurons, this is calculated as the number 
of vesicles of neurotransmitter available in their synapse for continuous 
signalling at high-rates without restocking of the vesicles (p.565-6). In 
arriving at their conclusion about retinal safety margins, they argue that 
there are at least twice as many vesicles as needed under normal stimulation 
conditions. In this case we have seen that a design approach borrowed from 
civil engineering plays a clear and striking role in these neuroscientist’s 
definition, operationalization and explanation of robustness in the retina.   
 
Another example comes from Davis’s (2006) review of work on homeostatic 
regulation2 in the nervous system. As he writes:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Note that Davis makes a conceptual distinction between robust properties 
and properties under homeostatic control: “In general, robustness describes a 
system with a reproducible output, whereas homeostasis refers to a system 
with a constant output” (2006, p.308). I will ignore this difference for the 
purposes of the paper since homeostatic systems conform to Kitano’s general 
definition robust systems.  
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“Homeostatic control systems are best understood in engineering theory, 
where they are routinely implemented in systems such as aircraft flight 
control. Recently, biological signaling systems have been analyzed with 
the tools of engineering theory….” (p.314)  
Accordingly, homeostatic control systems have a number of “required 
features”: 1) a set point which defines the target output of the system; 2) 
feedback; 3) precision in resetting the output back to the set point, following a 
perturbation; and (normally) 4) sensors which measure the difference 
between the actual output and the set point (p.309). 
 
Thus control theory offers neuroscientists clear and experimentally testable 
criteria for determining whether a system undergoes homeostatic regulation, 
by looking for these required features (e.g. the existence of a set point) in a 
system. The operating conditions of homeostatic regulation, and the 
biophysical mechanisms of feedback, sensors, etc., are also open to 
experimental investigation. Reported examples of properties under 
homeostatic control are muscle excitation at the neuromuscular junction 
(p.309) and bursting properties of invertebrate neurons (p.311). More 
recently, O’Leary et al. (2014, p.818) argue that ion channel expression in 
their simplified model of invertebrate neurons can be understood as an 
implementation of integral control, a standard control-theoretic architecture.  
 
Figure 2 (if space) schematic for integral control 
  
Chirimuuta (forthcoming)  Robustness in Neuroscience 	  
 
3. CRASH TESTING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
Before considering the question of whether the engineering framework 
becomes structurally unsound when applied to some kinds of neural systems, 
I would like to draw our attention to some of its features. The basic ideas are 
clearly illustrated in Sterling and Freed’s (2007) example of the bridge. When 
one considers the robustness of an engineered artefact like the bridge, it is 
presupposed that the system is built up from component parts in such a way 
as to achieve a specific function. The robustness of the bridge is conceptually 
distinct from its other designed features or functions, and it can trade off 
against some of them. For example, the more robust the bridge is to the 
passage of the occasional heavy vehicle, the more expensive it will be to build 
(because requiring more steel) (p.563). Moreover, the perturbations against 
which the system is robust are thought of as atypical events, also 
conceptually distinct from the normal operations of the system.  
 
There is also the tendency to think of robustness as allowing the system, 
following a perturbation, to return to its initial stable state. Some 
experiments specifically involve the operationalization of the robustness of a 
system as the reversion to a prior state. For example, reporting on an 
experiment in which mouse premotor cortex in one hemisphere was inhibited 
using optogenetics during the preparation period for the animal’s movement, 
Svoboda (2015)3 writes, that “[t]his preparatory activity is remarkably robust 
to large-scale unilateral optogenetic perturbations: detailed dynamics that 
drive specific future movements are quickly and selectively restored by the 
network.” This notion of robustness as the ability of the system to revert to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To my knowledge, these results have not yet been published in a journal. I 
have contacted the author to find out if the study is under review or in press.  
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prior functional states is similar to the idea of homeostasis as the ability of a 
system to stabilize some quantity in spite of external changes.  
 
Figure 3 (if space) After Kitano (2004, Figure 1) 
 
Eve Marder’s laboratory has carried out a long term investigation into the 
ability of neurons to maintain stable electrophysiological properties despite 
continual turnover of the ion channels embedded in the cell membrane which 
are responsible for its electrical excitability. This research project is one of 
the central examples of the study of robustness in neural systems. Marder 
and her collaborators make ample use of the engineering framework when 
reviewing other results and reporting their findings. For example, O’Leary et 
al. (2013, p.E2645) write: 
“Both theoretical and experimental studies suggest that maintaining 
stable intrinsic excitability is accomplished via homeostatic, negative 
feedback processes that use intracellular Ca2+ concentrations as a sensor 
of activity and then alter[s] the synthesis, insertion, and degradation of 
membrane conductances to achieve a target activity level.”  
 
What is striking about the characterization of electrophysiological stability in 
the face of ion channel turnover as a kind of robustness in the face of a 
perturbation (e.g. p.E2651), is the fact that the turnover is just part of the 
normal physiology of the cell. There is no functional and stable state of the 
cell in which this turnover does not occur—a fact which these authors also 
highlight.4 This brings our attention to some strains in the application of the 
engineering framework to this biological system.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “neurons in the brains of long-lived animals must maintain reliable function 
over the animal’s lifetime while all of their ion channels and receptors are 
replaced in the membrane over hours, days, or weeks. Consequently, ongoing 
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In the basic engineering characterisation of robustness, sketched above, 
perturbations are different from the normal circumstances in which the 
system is expected to operate. “Perturbation” carries the everyday 
connotation of an event which throws the system off balance and is 
deleterious to its normal functioning. We cannot think of the events of ion 
channel turnover as perturbations in this sense; they are business as usual 
for the cell. 
 
Furthermore, it is not in the nature of the system to seek to return to a prior, 
stable arrangement of its parts. A crucial property of the nervous system is 
its plasticity: the tendency for its component parts and the connections 
linking them to be continually sculpted by experience. The homeostatic 
mechanisms which Marder and colleagues investigate need to be understood 
as maintaining specific properties (such as a cell’s Ca2+ concentration) at a 
certain point, but not (nor do these researchers claim it) some generalised 
operation for achieving system-wide internal stability (see §4.4). 
 
In the basic engineering conception of robustness, there is a clear conceptual 
distinction between the features of a system which allow it to carry out its 
intended function, and those which make the system robust (even if in reality 
one individual feature can serve both purposes). In the case of the neuron 
which has continual ion channel turnover and no definite stable state to 
return to following these “perturbations”, it is not clear that we can we make 
this distinction. A more natural way to think about this and other biological 
systems is as ones, unlike engineered artefacts, “designed” to keep changing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the essential excitability properties of the neuron” (O’Leary et al. 2013, 
p.E2645). 
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and “designed” to maintain functional stability in the midst of this constant 
change.5  
 
The tensions and strains associated with the application of the basic 
engineering framework to biological systems can be felt more sharply if we 
appeal to a process metaphysics of biological “things” (Dupré 2012). According 
to this view, organisms are not substances but processes—items whose 
existence depends on the taking place of certain changes. This highlights the 
fact that the life of organisms depends on a continual turnover of its 
component parts, and that the system as a whole, while living, persists longer 
than its parts. Yet features and functions of the organism remain relatively 
stable. For example, memories can endure for decades even though the 
neurons that form them have undergone material change. This stability must 
be achieved—somehow. And so processes for robustness are not cleanly 
distinct from the general maintenance processes which keep the organism 
alive. 
 
The processual nature of neurons is nicely described by Marder and Goaillard 
(2012, p.563): 
“each neuron is constantly rebuilding itself from its constituent proteins, 
using all of the molecular and biochemical machinery of the cell.”  
(and see F n 4) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  This blurring of the lines between mechanisms for robustness and 
mechanisms for life is highlighted by Edelman & Gally (2001: 13763) in their 
discussion of the difference between redundancy and degeneracy in biological 
systems: “the term redundancy somewhat misleadingly suggests a property 
selected exclusively during evolution, either for excess capacity or for fail-safe 
security. We take the contrary position that degeneracy is not a property 
simply selected by evolution, but rather is a prerequisite for and an 
inescapable product of the process of natural selection itself.” They also 
discuss another disanalogy between engineered and biological systems—the 
applicability of “design” talk.  
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We can contrast this with the substance metaphysics that we usually assume 
when thinking about engineered artefacts. A bridge or an aeroplane is what 
it is because of the parts which comprise it. Its existence does not depend on 
the occurrence of any process. This is not to deny that an expert in the theory 
of matter might well argue that the steel of the bridge maintains its integrity 
because of some fundamental processes. The point is that when 
characterising the robustness of the bridge or the aeroplane we would not 
resort to such sophistication. Rather, we think of the bridge as a substance 
and not a process—a steel structure which, in order to maintain its function 
in the face of perturbation, must resist rather than effect the swapping 
around of its component parts.  
 
 
4. EXAMINING REASONS TO RE-ENGINEER 
 
Now that we have noted these disanalogies between biological organisms and 
engineered things, we ought to worry that the framework borrowed from 
engineering is misleading when thinking about robustness in the brain and 
other biological systems. Is it time to re-engineer our conceptual tools for 
thinking about robustness to make them more suitable for characterising 
living things? In this section I consider four possible answers to this question.  
 
4.1 No. The terms in the engineering framework are just words that are used 
to facilitate communication of the neuroscientific results.6   
 
One potential response to the concerns raised in the previous section is that 
they stem from a superficial fixation on the vocabulary neuroscientists use 
when writing about their research. Just because the authors discussed above 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A response along these lines was suggested to me by Timothy O’Leary, in 
conversation.  
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have employed certain words first introduced by engineers, it does not follow 
that their understanding of neurophysiology is distorted by comparisons with 
engineering. For example, I mentioned that the word “perturbation” has a 
negative connotation which makes it seem inappropriate when describing 
non-pathological and frequent events like ion channel turnover. It could well 
be that in the context of this research the term takes on a different 
meaning—for example, as any event that the system cannot directly control,7 
such as changes in protein configuration due to thermal noise.  
 
I believe that this response is warranted by what we know of the 
methodology of some of the investigations discussed above, but not all of 
them. In the case of Sterling and Freed (2007) I was careful to show that the 
engineering conceptions directly shaped how these neuroscientists 
operationalized and quantified robustness, and how they identified 
mechanisms by which robustness is achieved. There is no indication that they 
used terms such as “safety factor” to mean something radically different in 
the context of neuroscience.   
 
A very explicit statement of the aim to apply engineering principles directly 
to the understanding of the premotor cortex comes from Svoboda (2015): 
“preparatory activity is distributed in a redundant manner across weakly 
coupled modules. These are the same principles used to build robustness 
into engineered control systems. Our studies therefore provide an example 
of consilience between neuroscience and engineering.”  
Thus the convergence between a neurophysiological and the engineering 
perspective on the mouse motor planning system is taken to be an important 
result of this study. This echoes Sterling and Laughlin’s (2015, pp. xiii-xv) 
proposal that enquiring to see how engineering principles are implemented in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I thank Timothy O’Leary for this suggestion.  
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neural systems, and the attempt thereby to reverse-engineer the brain, leads 
to insights not otherwise available through routine data collection.  
 
4.2 No. The inadequacies you point out with the engineering framework are 
based on a caricature of mechanical engineering, not the actual complex 
discipline.8 
 
My characterisation of the engineering framework assumes that mechanical 
engineering (the design of bridges, aeroplanes and such like) is paradigmatic 
of the engineering approach in general. But of course there are many 
different kinds of engineering, from mechanical to electronic to 
communications and chemical. It could well be that the mismatch between 
understanding the robustness of a highly dynamic entity like the brain, and 
the rather static conception of robust objects that falls out of the basic 
engineering framework is just an artefact of only focussing narrowly on the 
kind of engineering that is actually furthest away from neuroscience.   
 
It would take me beyond the scope of this short article (and well beyond my 
own knowledge of the subject) to sketch out the various possible frameworks 
associated with each field of engineering specifically, and to see which 
conception of robustness is most suitable for biology. However, what I will say 
is that there is evidence in the studies discussed above that neuroscientists 
themselves do sometimes draw from the mechanically based caricature. This 
is particularly true of Sterling and Freed (2007). In contrast, when Davis 
(2006) and O’Leary (2014) make direct appeal to engineering they refer 
specifically to models in control theory.9 This invites questions, still, about 
whether the paradigm examples of controlled systems (e.g. a car driven on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This concern was raised by Arnon Levy and Timothy O’Leary. 
9 See also Zhang and Chase (2015) on the physical control system perspective 
on brain computer interfaces for motor rehabilitation. 
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cruise control, a Watt governor, or an aeroplane flown on autopilot) are 
dynamical enough capture the processual nature of the nervous system.  
 
4.3 Yes. The brain is so different from an engineered artefact that the 
framework is misleading and inappropriate. 
 
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 I discussed two reasons for thinking that we should 
not be concerned about any radical disanalogy between robustness in 
biological and engineered systems. While I agree that these are important 
points to keep in mind, I do not think that they diffuse the fundamental 
concern that when neuroscientists borrow engineers’ terms in order to study 
robustness, they risk mischaracterising the brain as more like an engineered 
artefact than it actually is. Is the appropriate conclusion, then, that a neural 
circuit is so different from a bridge or an aeroplane that the engineering 
framework is simply misleading and should be discarded? 
 
The best way to make this strong negative case is to consider some historical 
examples in which reasoning by analogy with engineered systems seems to 
have lead neuroscientists and theorists astray. One example comes from von 
Békésy, a physicist and communications engineer who turned his attention to 
inhibition in the nervous system.  In his book Sensory Inhibition he notes 
that there are feedback loops everywhere in nervous system and he asks how 
it is that system manages to avoid ending up in a dysfunctional oscillatory 
state (1967, p.25). It seems that von Békésy is importing his understanding of 
systems containing feedback from engineering, and in that context 
oscillations are normally problematic and efforts must be made to dampen 
them. These days neuroscientists seek to understand how oscillations in the 
healthy brain  (i.e. its characteristic patterns of endogenous activity) are 
actually responsible for cognitive functions, and how these oscillations differ 
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from the ones associated with pathologies such as epilepsy and Parkinson’s 
disease.10  
 
Another example is the comparison of the effects of “noise” in brains and 
artificial signalling systems…… GET EXAMPLE 
 This is very different from how neuroscientists understand noise today, 
which begins with the idea that brains evolved under constraints imposed by 
noisy “components”, which has therefore shaped all aspects of neural 
computation (Faisal et al. 2008). It would be a mistake to think of the brain 
processing information in the same way as an electronic computer, but with 
added redundancy to offset the noisiness of individual processing streams. 
 
 
The cautionary tales just told give some concrete indications of how 
imposition of the engineering framework on to neural systems can lead to 
conclusions which in retrospect appear false and misguided. But it would be 
too hasty infer from these two examples that current work on robustness in 
neuroscience is of dubious standing whenever it appeals to the concepts of 
engineering. A more general argument is the following: the brain is not like a 
bridge (or a computer, or an aeroplane on autopilot….); therefore whenever 
neuroscientists appeal to terms borrowed from the analysis of such systems, 
they risk saying things that are simply false because they fail to notice 
relevant disanalogies. This lays all the sceptical cards on the table. In the last 
part of the paper I attempt to mitigate these worries.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a scientific overview see Buzsáki (2006).  For discussion of 
philosophical implications, see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2013). See also 
Knuuttila and Loettgers (2013, p.160) on a parallel difference across 
engineering and cell biology, where oscillations are found to have a functional 
role. 
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4.4 No. Use of the engineering framework should be thought of as a 
simplifying strategy. 
 
Neuroscientist Steven Rose (2012:61) writes that:  
“one of the most common but misleading terms in the biology student’s 
lexicon is homeostasis….[the] concept of the stability of the body’s internal 
environment. But such stability is achieved by dynamic responses; stasis 
is death, and homeodynamics needs to replace homeostasis as the relevant 
concept”11 
This seems to capture the problem that was first noted in Section 3, that we 
should not be mislead by the engineering framework into thinking of neural 
systems as seeking to maintain an initial stable state. But we also noted that 
the neuroscientists employing control-theoretic models of homeostatic 
mechanisms are not thinking of their systems as seeking stability in this very 
general way. Instead, they are modelling the stability of a specific variable—
in the case of O’Leary et al. (2014), the concentration of Ca2+—and 
investigating the mechanisms by which it is controlled. To this end, it is 
reasonable to interpret the system as an integral controller (p.818).12 Thus it 
is still useful to talk about homeostasis with respect to Ca2+ concentration, 
even while thinking of the system as a whole, and in reality, as a 
“homeodynamic” one. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Compare Sterling (2012) on the concept of allostasis – stability through 
change with an emphasis on predictive regulation. Day (2005) and O’Leary 
and Wyllie (2011), in contrast, argue that the concept of homeostasis easily 
accommodates these dynamic and predictive aspects, and that the term 
allostasis is therefore superfluous. It is an interesting question (but beyond 
the scope of this paper) whether the narrow or wide definition of homeostasis 
is currently more prevalent amongst biologists and neuroscientists. 	  
12 Note that O’Leary et al. (2014) study of homeostasis is via a model of a 
neuron. But the model is realistic enough that it is expected to shed light on 
actual biophysical mechanisms. 
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I think of neuroscientists whose investigation of robustness in the brain is 
scaffolded by the engineering framework as providing idealized mechanistic 
explanations. Their explanatory target is, for example, the process by which 
overall neuronal activity level is controlled via regulation of ion channel gene 
transcription through a Ca2+ sensitive feedback loop. This is standard fodder 
for mechanistic explanation. At the same time, the framework of 
engineering—in this case the schematic of the integral controller—serves to 
direct attention to specific parts and processes in the extremely complex 
cellular machinery and to interpret them in control theoretic terms (sensors, 
feedback loops, etc.), while bracketing other aspects not immediately relevant 
to the explanation of robustness.  
 
Bechtel (2015, p.92) has presented the case that: 
“mechanisms are [to be] viewed not as entities in the world, but as posits 
in mechanistic explanations that provide idealized accounts of what is in 
the world.” 
His example is the idealization (understood as “falsehood”) that scientists 
introduce by putting boundaries around putative mechanisms which in 
nature do not exist. In the cases explored in this paper, the idealization 
comes in through the analogical reasoning of treating a neuronal system as if 
it is an engineered artefact. This, like the positing of boundaries, is a useful 
way to simplify the explanandum. It enables neuroscientists to bracket some 
of the known facts about the brain’s messy, Heraclitean nature. But it means, 
perhaps, that there is a stark difference between the brain viewed sub specie 
aeternatis (what some neuroscientists call the “ground truth” of the brain) 
and viewed sub specie mechinae (in the guise of a machine).  
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